United Nations S/2014/421

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2014

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Letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 13 June 2014 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, forwarding a report on the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan covering the period from 1 February to 30 April 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Letter dated 13 June 2014 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 2120 (2013), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from 1 February 2014 to 30 April 2014 (see enclosure). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Council.

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

I. Introduction

Overview

1. The present report responds to the request made in Security Council resolution 2120 (2013) for the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to keep the Council regularly informed, through the United Nations Secretary-General, on the implementation of the ISAF mandate. The report covers the period from 1 February to 30 April 2014.

2. The ISAF campaign is focused on preparing the Afghan National Security Forces to assume full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The Afghan forces are now almost fully fielded, and the focus of ISAF is on developing and sustaining the quality of their personnel. ISAF continues to develop the sustainability of the national forces and seeks to mitigate remaining capability gaps in critical areas such as aviation and intelligence, as well as developmental shortfalls in areas such as logistics and human resources management. "Capability gaps" are those critical areas where the requisite capability is nascent or non-existent. "Developmental shortfalls", by comparison, are areas in which the Afghan forces or the Afghan security institutions have some level of capability but still require significant further development in order to achieve proficiency and the requisite effectiveness.

3. The Afghan forces have continued to make progress in terms of being professional, effective and capable of providing security throughout Afghanistan. They have demonstrated their capability to enable and secure the first round of presidential and provincial elections, which were the key events in the reporting period.

International Security Assistance Force levels

4. As at 1 April 2014, a total of 51,176 ISAF personnel were in theatre, provided by 28 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 20 non-NATO countries.

International Security Assistance Force casualties

5. ISAF casualties[1] decreased by approximately 60 per cent during the reporting period compared with the same period in 2013.

Civilian casualties

6. ISAF assesses that the number of insurgent-caused civilian casualties has increased by more than 60 per cent over the same quarter in 2013 and accounts for more than 90 per cent of all conflict-related civilian deaths. The insurgents' indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices is the cause of the overwhelming

[1] In the present report the term "casualties" refers to individua's killed and wounded as a consequence of the conflict in Afghanistan.

majority of civilian casualties. Such devices were also used in two high-profile attacks in Kabul in late March.

7. The number of civilian casualties for which ISAF was responsible during the quarter under review is assessed to have decreased by over 50 per cent compared with the same quarter in 2013 and to have accounted for less than 1 per cent of all civilian casualties. ISAF has continued to increase its efforts to minimize civilian casualties by reviewing directives and operational procedures, promoting transparency and working with the Afghan forces to enhance their civilian casualty mitigation efforts.

8. ISAF has taken additional measures to address the clearance of explosive remnants of war from firing ranges and bases prior to closure. Considerable progress has been made in incorporating internationally recognized clearance standards into ISAF procedures for future base closures and to identify hazard areas. ISAF is increasing its efforts to mark and clear explosive remnants of war from high-explosive firing ranges that have already closed. Recent ISAF reports have confirmed the presence of 184 such ranges located in the vicinity of ISAF bases, of which a significant number remain to be cleared.

Transition

9. The overall positive progress made by the Afghan forces in professionalizing themselves continued throughout the reporting period. The forces have been in the lead of security efforts in Afghanistan since June 2013 and continue to be on track to successfully assume full responsibility for security by the end of 2014.

II. Security situation

10. Overall, enemy-initiated attacks were down by 20 per cent over the same period in 2013.

11. During the quarter under review, the insurgents focused on disrupting the 2014 presidential elections. Nevertheless, the Afghan forces successfully shaped the security environment and provided the support necessary for the first round of the presidential election on 5 April 2014. The insurgency has thus far not had a significant impact on the electoral process. While the insurgents did manage to conduct several high-profile attacks in Kabul during the reporting period, those attacks did not have the intended effect of deterring Afghans from voting. No high-profile attacks were carried out on election day.

12. In order to deny the enemy influence and improve security for the smooth and democratic transfer of power, the Afghan forces focused their operations on shaping the environment and inspiring confidence in the Afghan people. After months of intensive campaign planning and extensive joint rehearsals, the forces conducted several large and complex operations across the country prior to the election. The successful execution of those operations demonstrated that the Afghan forces have the operational capability necessary to disrupt the insurgency and protect the population. As at April 2014, the Afghan forces are leading 98 per cent of conventional operations and 99 per cent of special operations. Overall, enemy-initiated attacks were down slightly from the same period in 2013, when ISAF was still conducting operations. Considering the reduction in ISAF support and the elections, the reduction in enemy-initiated attacks is notable.

III. Afghan security institutions and the Afghan forces

13. The experience and confidence that the Afghan forces have gained since the beginning of the transition process has enabled them to take a proactive and comprehensive approach to election security. The planning for security during the elections was conducted almost entirely by the Afghan forces, which, by providing a safe and secure environment, enabled millions of Afghans to vote. This success clearly demonstrated the Afghan forces' growing ability to provide effective country-wide security. The challenge for the forces in the short term is to provide the same level of security for the second round of elections in the face of an insurgency that is likely to be larger in terms of its numbers and that, having learned lessons from the first round, will be more determined to successfully disrupt the process. In the longer term, their challenge will be to sustain the operational tempo throughout the winter, as ISAF transitions to its post-2014 mission, Resolute Support, and in the following fighting seasons.

14. The success so far has been the result of the continued progress made by the Afghan security institutions and the Afghan forces in developing a professional and effective force. Despite the positive development in building and training the force, and the successful delivery of security and counter-insurgency operations, the Afghan forces still face challenges. They are tactically and operationally effective but are not yet fully sustainable. Work remains to be done to develop the Afghan security institutions and the Afghan forces fully and to a self-sustainable level. The security ministries have demonstrated some growth in human resources management and in the alignment of strategy and resources. Ministerial capacity remains a capability gap, however, with limitations in planning, programming, budgeting and execution, as well as in facilities, logistics and oversight functions. The Afghan forces have demonstrated improvement in tactical operations planning and execution, in explosive ordnance disposal training and in their capacity to counter the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. Key capability gaps remain, however, in aviation, intelligence and special operations, and developmental shortfalls exist in areas such as systems maintenance, requirement forecasting and human capital. Moreover, one factor directly affecting the Afghan forces' self-sustainability in the long term is the inability of the Government of Afghanistan to generate sufficient revenue to finance them. All these shortfalls are being addressed, but will not be completely eliminated by the end of 2014.

15. The gains made are not irreversible and continued security support beyond 2014 is essential for ensuring long-term viability. As ISAF prepares for the end of the mission in December 2014, there are two campaign imperatives. First, ISAF is taking steps to reduce risks and ensure a smooth transition. Second, ISAF is building Afghan forces' sustainability, while providing support to them as they continue to prepare for both the transition of political power and the 2014 fighting season. ISAF forces will complete the shift from combat-advising at the unit level to functionally based security force assistance, whereby advisers focus on tasks to build the Afghan forces' long-term sustainability to ensure that progress persists. Finally, international funding and support are still critical to sustain a force capable of providing a stable and secure environment and of preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorism.

16. The Afghan air force continues to train its personnel with the assistance of NATO Air Training Command — Afghanistan. Progress has continued according to

plan in fielding the air force's required enablers and trained personnel. Obstacles to the development of the air force include finding qualified recruits, maintenance training and sustainment. It has been assessed that the air force will not reach full operational capability before 2017.

17. The quality of the Afghan army and national police and, in particular, their leadership, officers and non-commissioned officers, remains critical to the long-term sustainability of the Afghan forces. As the Afghan forces have effectively taken the lead responsibility for security, so the Afghan people have begun to show more ownership of and pride in their security forces. After a February 2014 attack on an army outpost in which 21 Afghan soldiers were killed, Afghan citizens used social media to condemn the attack and demonstrated in several cities.

18. According to recent surveys, Afghan perceptions of security remain consistent, with 64 per cent of respondents having a favourable opinion of the national police and 67 per cent having a favourable view of the army. Approximately 57 per cent of the Afghans surveyed responded that the Afghan forces (either the army or the national police, depending on the area) brought the most security to their area, and 80 per cent of Afghan respondents believed that the Government was leading the effort to improve security in Afghanistan. While perceptions of the Afghan forces remain steady, over half of Afghan respondents believed that both the army and the national police were capable but needed additional resources. These survey results indicate that many Afghans believe that international community support and resources are necessary for long-term sustainability.

19. The Afghan forces' health-care system continues to grow and develop. The forces' medical leadership remains actively engaged in the development of their hospital capabilities. The Afghan forces continue to manage their battlefield and to provide medical care for serious and routine casualties, but they still require some coalition support for critical casualties and medical transportation by air.

20. In February 2014, the Afghan Council of Ministers ordered the dissolution of the Afghan Public Protection Force as a State-run enterprise and the Ministry of the Interior of Afghanistan announced the reorganization of the Public Protection Force as part of the Afghan national police. While the State-owned portion of the Force has been dissolved, its more than 20,000-strong guard force will remain separate, responsible to a deputy minister within the Ministry of the Interior and continue to provide security services. The Ministry of the Interior has directed the Force to continue operations. Currently, convoy security escorts are being professionally conducted by the Force.

21. The Afghan local police continues to provide local security, particularly in rural population centres. During the quarter under review, it grew to 26,691 guardians deployed in 146 districts.

22. To summarize, the Afghan forces are capable and appear to be inspiring confidence in the Afghan people. They have continued to make positive progress and are on track to assume full responsibility for security in December 2014. Key limitations remain, however, requiring support and assistance from security force assistance advisory teams and ministerial advisers. Further effort is needed to ensure the long-term viability and sustainability of the force, necessitating continued advisory support, international commitment and funding support.

IV. Civil-military interaction

Governance support

23. The first rounds of the Afghan presidential election and the provincial council elections were the key events in the reporting period. The Afghan forces continued to bear primary responsibility for election security, with ISAF providing, upon request, logistical support, including delivery of election material at the national level. ISAF also provided secure accommodation for the election support team of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe following the Taliban attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul on 20 March 2014. Requests for ISAF support have, however, remained low. On election day, there were no ISAF casualties.

Development support

24. The number of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan has further decreased, from four to two. The remaining teams, in Balkh and Jowzjan, are cooperating with the Government's Independent Directorate of Local Governance to ensure a smooth transition process.

Distribution of tasks of the International Security Assistance Force

25. The transfer of ISAF tasks to the Government of Afghanistan is ongoing and is now integrated into the broader transition effort in Afghanistan. The ISAF ministerial advisory groups continue to play a key role in assisting the Government in articulating their requirements and defining strategies to exercise their sovereignty and assume responsibility for key tasks previously carried out by ISAF. Moreover, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan continues to play a key role in engaging the Kabul-based international community and in keeping the primary donors, international organizations and non-governmental organizations informed of progress.

V. Redeployment

26. ISAF redeployment remains on track, although the process continues to be one of unprecedented scale and complexity. Redeployment activities remain fully coherent with the ISAF campaign plan, which aims to optimize the use of resources, facilities, movement infrastructure and lines of communication. Personnel and equipment are leaving theatre at an acceptable rate, subject to periodic fluctuations resulting from a variety of factors, including insurgent and criminal interdiction of redeployment consignments, climatic conditions, political constraints and bureaucratic friction. Strategic airlift capacity is sufficient to mitigate constraints on the ground and remains the fastest, most flexible and safest mode of transport.

VI. Border crossing points

27. The number of major incidents across the border with Pakistan almost doubled compared with the same period in 2013. Cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani border forces was good but ISAF continues to explore further ways to improve the relationship. Relatively minor border issues can quickly reverse these advances, however, and negatively affect the broader bilateral setting.

28. All five border crossing points along the Pakistan ground lines of communication and the northern lines of communication remained open during the reporting period, with some limitations experienced through the Torkham border crossing point owing to the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf protest on the northern ground line of communication.

VII. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)

29. ISAF continues to support efforts to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) by the Afghan security institutions and the Afghan forces. ISAF efforts related to the implementation of the resolution are focused on developing and establishing conditions to improve Afghan women's participation in security services (recruitment and retention), providing adequate conditions (facilities and infrastructure) and educating and training. ISAF is committed to supporting and assisting the Government of Afghanistan, in particular the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, on implementing gender strategies and policies.

30. Progress has been observed in terms of the implementation of the latest policies and strategies approved in 2013 by the Ministry of Defence (Human Rights and Gender Integration Directorate Working Plan 2013-2016 and the Female Management Accession Policy, including through the establishment by the Ministry of two working groups, one on women's training and the other on gender integration). These initiatives focused on addressing the most challenging reasons hampering the inclusion of women in the Afghan forces, both in the medium and in the long term, and on setting the conditions for achieving the recruitment goals for 2014.

31. Prior to the elections, the Ministry of the Interior implemented a programme to recruit "female searchers". Approximately 13,000 female searchers were deployed to over 6,000 polling centres, where they enabled Afghan women to vote. Female participation in the elections of 5 April was estimated at 35 per cent of 7 million voters. While this is understood to be a very positive development, the focus will now shift to planning for the second round of the presidential election in order to ensure that an adequate number of female searchers are available to support what might be an even higher turnout of female voters.

32. Progress was also observed in education and training efforts at the army's National Officer Academy during 2014, where courses for women officers restarted after 13 months without candidates. Initiatives have been taken to improve the conditions of women within the army, but major challenges in recruitment remain.

VIII. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005)

33. During the past quarter, Afghan children continued to be adversely affected by the conflict in a number of ways. On 8 February 2014, a child was used by the Taliban as suicide bomber in Paktika Province, and children were victims in the attack on the Serena Hotel of 20 March 2014.

34. ISAF headquarters has, in cooperation with UNAMA, monitored incidents of underage recruitment into the Afghan forces and other violations of children's

rights. ISAF personnel are under instruction to ensure that any apparent abuse of human rights be immediately brought to the attention of others in their chain of command for onward reporting and action.

35. ISAF continues to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 2145 (2014), in which the Council stressed the importance of implementing its resolution 1612 (2005) and called for the full implementation by the Government of Afghanistan of the provisions of the action plan on preventing and responding to underage recruitment, in close cooperation with UNAMA.

IX. Conclusion

36. The full transfer of responsibility for security from ISAF to the Afghan forces remains on track. During the first rounds of the presidential and provincial elections, the Afghan forces provided the security necessary to facilitate a democratic process with limited assistance from ISAF. The logistical support provided by ISAF was limited to the movement of election materials. While the Afghan forces have continued to make progress in developing their professionalism and capacities, capability gaps and developmental shortfalls remain. They require continued NATO focus and international community support to mitigate them. ISAF is working to reduce these gaps and shortfalls with targeted measures such as aviation training and equipment, continued funding, continued training, advice and assistance to the Afghan security institutions and through international community support to enable the Government of Afghanistan to generate and manage revenue. ISAF remains on track to fulfil its mandate and to transition to a follow-on mission, if the necessary legal framework is in place and NATO nations so decide. Uninterrupted international support and engagement are essential to maintaining security and stability in Afghanistan after 2014.

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Security Council

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Sixth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1956 (2010)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1956 (2010), in which the Council requested me to provide written reports on an ongoing basis to the Council every six months about the United Nations Compensation Fund, with effect from 1 January 2012, evaluating the continued compliance with the provisions of paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003), which requires Iraq to deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas into the Fund. This sixth report covers the developments following the issuance of my fifth report (S/2013/749) on 18 December 2013.

II. Developments

2. In its authority over the arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Compensation Fund, the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission has continued to actively monitor deposits into the Fund. The Compensation Commission secretariat has also continued to engage with the Iraq Committee of Financial Experts, the oversight body for the control, reporting and use of Iraqi oil revenues.

3. The Compensation Commission secretariat met with the Iraq Committee of Financial Experts in Berlin on 20 February 2014. During this meeting, the Head of the Committee reiterated the commitment of Iraq to complying with applicable United Nations resolutions. Further, he advised that the current mechanism for the payment of 5 per cent of revenues from the sale of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products into the Compensation Fund remains unchanged. With regard to the obligation to deposit the equivalent of 5 per cent of non-monetary payments of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas made to service providers under resolution 1956 (2010), an additional amount of $259.4 million has been deposited to the Fund in relation to such transactions since my last report in December 2013. This has brought the total deposited in relation to non-monetary payments to $810.1 million since the Committee assumed oversight over Iraq's oil revenues in July 2011.

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4. The average monthly income accruing to the Compensation Fund for the year to date is approximately $353 million, with quarterly payments of compensation awards continuing to average in excess of $1 billion. Since my last report to the Security Council, the Compensation Commission has made two payments to Kuwait totalling $2.02 billion: the first was made on 23 January 2014 and the second on 24 April 2014. The overall amount of compensation paid to date by the Commission is $45.5 billion, leaving approximately $6.9 billion outstanding to be paid to Kuwait to settle the last remaining claim.

5. The Governing Council held its seventy-seventh session on 29 and 30 April 2014. At the opening plenary, the Iraqi delegation reaffirmed Iraq's commitment to meeting its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. In its conclusion on the issue of arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Compensation Fund, the Governing Council expressed its continued satisfaction with the transfer of 5 per cent of Iraq's oil revenues and the equivalent 5 per cent of the value of non-monetary payments to the Compensation Fund.

6. At the time of that session, the Governing Council was cognizant of the dispute between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government regarding the issue of export sales of oil from the Kurdistan region. In response to the developments following the session, regarding export sales of oil out of the Kurdistan region without the consent of the Government of Iraq, the Governing Council held an informal meeting on 12 June 2014. Noting that Iraq is nearing the conclusion of the fulfilment of its obligations, with outstanding compensation projected to be paid in full in 2015, the Governing Council encourages the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to work together to ensure that Iraq continues to deposit 5 per cent of all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas from Iraq into the Compensation Fund, as required under paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1956 (2010). My Special Representative for Iraq will continue efforts to facilitate a prompt resolution of this matter.

7. As the audit of the financial statements for the Development Fund for Iraq and the successor account, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2013, has not been finalized, the results will be reflected in my next report. However, based on current levels of income accruing to the Compensation Fund and the Governing Council's satisfaction therewith, I am satisfied that the Government of Iraq remains committed to complying with its obligations under paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003).

8. I would like to conclude by expressing my ongoing appreciation to the Government of Iraq and the Iraq Committee of Financial Experts for their continued cooperation with the Compensation Commission.

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16 June 2014

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 16 June 2014 from the Deputy Permanent Representative and Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations stating that Ms. Harriet Cross has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of May 2014 (see annex II). It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal Tympou airport contrary to international rules and regulations.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that during the months of April and May, Turkey and its subordinate local administration in the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus issued several illegal Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), in an attempt to revoke NOTAMs previously issued by the competent authorities of the Republic. Turkey's actions not only stand in breach of international law but also seriously endanger safety and security in the reserved areas, as in one case they had been reserved for mine destruction explosions and, on two other occasions, for exercises conducted with live ammunition by the Danish Royal Navy.

Previously, in March, Turkey and its subordinate local administration illegally reserved an area in the north-west flight information region (FIR) of Cyprus, in which Turkish military aircraft conducted aeronautical exercises. This also occurred in late May. This latter incident greatly affected air traffic within the Nicosia FIR, especially flights from/to Larnaca and Pafos airports, as well as flights from Egypt to Turkey and vice versa.

Finally, in May, Turkey and its subordinate local administration, once again, issued an illegal NOTAM, following a NOTAM by the competent authorities of Cyprus regarding a request by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to conduct demining. This latest action is indicative of Turkey's provocative attitude, demonstrating its unwillingness to cooperate even with the United Nations in order to promote its own narrow political agenda.

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Turkey's actions are clearly aimed at undermining the Republic of Cyprus, emphasizing the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the island. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia FIR via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, impacts negatively on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic in Cyprus. On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 May	0907-1408	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
5 May	1405-1515	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 May	1054-1111	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1350-1607	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1743-1759	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
9 May	0940-1000	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1147-1203	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 May	1353-1620	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1458-1608	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
17 May	1156-1210	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	2205-2215	One GLF-4 Turkish aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
20 May	1020-1202	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1443-1535	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 May	0900-0936	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0909-0945	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0922-1011	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1047-1128	Five F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1047-1202	One KC-135 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1049-1112	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
	1113-1149	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1517-1605	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1628-1709	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1649-1706	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
	1726-1807	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1739-1817	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
23 May	0930-1030	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1409-1620	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1854-1913	One Do-328 aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, landing at the illegal Tympou airport.
25 May	0912-0927	One Do-328 aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having departed from the illegal Tympou airport.
27 May	1358-1607	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
28 May	0635-0952	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1003-1421	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1447-1825	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
29 May	0620-0955	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1000-1426	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1405-1804	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
30 May	0206-0553	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0606-1010	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0908-1145	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1010-1255	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1020-1245	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1023-1435	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1354-1510	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1415-1756	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
4-5 May	One A-1600 Turkish military transport ferry violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
7 May	One A-1600 Turkish military transport ferry violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
7-8 May	One P-333 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
8-9 May	One F-493 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
19-24 May	One S-354 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kerynia, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
26 May-June	One Turkish research/survey vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.

United Nations S/2014/425

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 June 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria and from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to draw your attention to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Cameroon, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Niger, and Nigeria, as well as representatives of the Republic of Benin, the European Union, France, Canada, the United States of America, the United Nations and the African Union, held in London under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom on 12 June 2014, to discuss security in Nigeria and the region. The conclusions of the meeting are contained in the annex to the present letter (see annex).

We would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

(*Signed*) Peter **Wilson**
Ambassador
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria and from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Conclusions of the London ministerial meeting on security in Nigeria, 12 June 2014

The Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, as well as representatives of Benin, the European Union, France, Canada, the United States, the United Nations and the African Union, met in London under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom on 12 June 2014 to discuss security in Nigeria and the region.

We reaffirmed our strong and united commitment to fighting terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria and the region. We condemn in the strongest terms the series of atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram and other groups. Nigeria and its neighbours committed to strengthen further the cooperation among regional States to bring home the abducted schoolgirls and defeat Boko Haram. They reaffirmed their commitment to human rights and civilian security, to the prevention of sexual violence in conflict and to the empowerment and education of women and girls. The abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls was a heinous example of the scourge of sexual violence, which we are determined to eliminate around the world. The countries of the region have all endorsed the ending sexual violence in conflict declaration.

We reaffirmed the commitments made at the Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria, held on 17 May 2014, and welcomed the progress made since then, particularly the memorandum of understanding on the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit, which was signed in Yaoundé on 9 June 2014. We further pledged that:

- Each of the Member countries would contribute a battalion to the Multinational Joint Task Force and support its headquarters through military advisers in the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. We will quickly operationalize further simultaneous or coordinated patrols

- Following the addition of Boko Haram to the United Nations Al-Qaida Sanctions List, we will work quickly through the United Nations Security Council to finalize the addition of Ansaru and the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, to the list. We will work with other States Members of the United Nations to help and encourage them to implement United Nations sanctions through appropriate domestic action. We will encourage Member States to propose other appropriate individuals, groups or entities for listing

- We commit to continue the close cooperation between the countries of the region and the international partners represented at the meeting in the search for the abducted girls and the fight against Boko Haram and other groups, including providing access and overflight clearances in agreement with regional Governments.

Alongside our law enforcement, military and intelligence cooperation, we recognized that security and stability can be achieved only through an approach that includes respect for human rights, alleviating poverty and creating jobs, strengthening rule of law and accountable governance, improving education,

protecting the rights of women and girls, and including women and civil society in efforts to resolve conflict.

The countries of the region commit to further efforts to achieve these aims in the most affected areas, for example operationalizing Nigeria's Presidential Initiative on the North-East to accelerate economic recovery and redevelopment in the region. International partners reaffirmed their commitment to support these initiatives, including through their development programmes and technical advice.

We welcome the work of the United Nations Office for West Africa, including the development of a United Nations integrated support package to assist Nigeria's efforts against Boko Haram, the African Union Strategy for the Sahel, including the Nouakchott Process on regional security, the Global Counterterrorism Forum and other regional initiatives on border security and border management, and commit to strengthen these initiatives further and ensure that they are well coordinated. We also welcomed the conclusions of the extraordinary summit of the Economic Community of West African States held on 30 May 2014. The United Nations will continue to coordinate the implementation of the United Nations strategy on the Sahel.

We commit to maintain a regular dialogue at the political level to ensure that operational agreements are followed up and that we regularly review the need for further action. We will remain united in our efforts to end terrorism in the region and bring security and prosperity to its people, while respecting the human rights of all.

The United Kingdom, France and the United States, together with other international partners, work closely with Nigeria and the region in the fight against terrorism. The Boko Haram insurgency represents a threat to the whole region and requires a regional response that integrates civilian and military efforts. We have further increased our support following the horrific abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls, including through deploying surveillance assets and the generating and fusing of intelligence, deploying cross-disciplinary expert teams to Nigeria, mobilizing our development programmes and providing help to victims and strong political support, including through the Paris and London meetings. We pledged today to increase that support further. Between us, we will:

- Ensure that the new Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit is operationalized quickly, following the signature on 9 June of the memorandum of understanding setting up the Unit
- Offer direct tactical training and advice to the Nigerian and regional forces engaged in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups
- Continue to strengthen the capacity of the Nigerian Government to deliver a coordinated and effective response to the terrorist threat
- Increase our support for girls' education in Nigeria and our assistance to the Nigerian and other Governments as they ensure that basic services and infrastructure are provided to the populations most menaced by terrorism and instability.

We will continue to coordinate our support closely between us and with other international partners, Nigeria and the region to ensure that it is well targeted and

effective. These efforts require a deepening of our reciprocal partnership with Nigeria and the region.

The Government of Nigeria has agreed to convene a follow-on conference in Abuja in September 2014.

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Security Council

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20 June 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith a letter addressed to the Secretary-General from Syrian and Arab lawyers (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 18 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic]

We, the undersigned lawyers, wish to affirm the following points:

Certain parties have been attempting to obtain a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to allow the entry of humanitarian aid without the agreement of the Syrian Government, even though the latter has not prevented anyone from going anywhere since the outset of the crisis. The sole purpose of the initiative is to use United Nations auspices for the delivery of logistical backing to the terrorists, in preparation for the establishment of "humanitarian corridors" under the protection of those very States that brought terrorism onto Syrian national territory. The corridors would assist the terrorists as a prelude for an attack on the Syrian State, using the pretext that the latter has violated the resolution that those parties are now trying to obtain from the Council. The proposed resolution uses humanitarian pretexts to conceal an aggressive intent that is inconsistent with the Charter and with United Nations counter-terrorism resolutions. Moreover, many of the terrorists are of non-Syrian origin, as evidenced by the letters and supporting documents sent to the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. We therefore support the Syrian State in standing up to such schemes. Our legal arguments are as follows:

First, in order to import any type of humanitarian aid to a Member State of the United Nations, prior consent must be obtained from that State. The decision whether to agree or refuse is a matter of national jurisdiction. Under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, the United Nations may not intervene in such matters, and no Member State may submit them to settlement under the Charter. That principle of the United Nations is reaffirmed in the relevant resolutions and the guiding principles contained in General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. Paragraph 3 of the guiding principles provides that the sovereignty, territorial and integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Humanitarian aid must therefore be imported with the agreement of the affected State. That point is emphasized in Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) on the humanitarian situation in Syria, which explicitly reaffirms the Council's strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Second, as Rousseau said, the facts are subject to justice, and not justice to the facts. It follows that the terrorist groups' control of certain border areas of Syria cannot grant them any form of legitimacy that would allow Member States or international organizations to enter into relations with them as though they had sovereign prerogatives. Such a situation would risk violating the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations counter-terrorism resolutions. It would amount to international recognition of the groups' legitimacy, which would in turn require the United Nations to apply to the terrorist groups the same standards set forth in the Charter in respect of any agreement that it may conclude with them.

Incidentally, the States and organizations that support importing humanitarian aid into Syria in coordination with the terrorist organizations and without consultation with the Syrian State would thereby violate General Assembly resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, which urges States to cooperate in order to take effective measures to combat terrorism. Such a precedent would imperil the very foundations of the United Nations and, in particular, its foremost objective, namely the peaceful settlement of disputes. It would be inconsistent with the right of the State to protect its citizens and exercise sovereignty over all of its territory.

Third, importing aid in coordination with terrorist organizations and without consultation with the Syrian State would amount to an attack on the Syrian State and on its territorial integrity and political independence. Not only would it violate the Charter; it would use the Charter as a pretext for aggression.

Fourth, Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon all States to prohibit by law incitement to terrorism, prevent such conduct and deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information. The approach that certain parties wish to impose on the United Nations clearly infringes that resolution. It would legitimize relations with terrorist organizations that have been included on the terrorism lists of the vast majority of world States, including those that fund and arm the groups both covertly and openly. It would also prevent the Syrian State from enforcing the international counter-terrorism resolutions; indeed, the State would be subjected to measures under Chapter VII of the Charter for doing so.

Fifth, it follows that the Syrian State's refusal to allow the United Nations and non-governmental organizations to deliver aid without its formal approval is grounded in and motivated by the Charter of the United Nations, international resolutions and Syrian counter-terrorism legislation. Syria's stance is based on United Nations law and resolutions. If anyone describes it as arbitrary, we invite them to provide the legal bases for their novel argument, which amounts to saying that the only way to protect civilians from terrorism is not to fight it, but to work with it.

Signatories





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United Nations S/2014/427

Security Council

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20 June 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

I. Introduction

1. This fourth report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolution by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The report covers the period 20 May to 17 June 2014. The information contained in the report is based on the data available to the United Nations actors on the ground and reports from open sources and sources of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

II. Major developments

A. Political/military

3. Severe levels of violence were ongoing during the reporting period, with intensified use of barrel bombs by Government forces against civilian populations reported in certain areas, such as the Bustan al-Qasr neighbourhood in eastern Aleppo City, and the continuation of mortar attacks against residential neighbourhoods by armed opposition forces. Extremist groups continued to carry out suicide attacks, executions and other acts of terrorism. Fighting between armed opposition groups and extremist forces continued in northern and north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic. Collectively these attacks caused thousands of deaths, injuries and the displacement of civilians throughout the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular Aleppo, Dar'a, Idlib, Rif Dimashq and Deir ez-Zor governorates.

4. In Aleppo, hundreds of civilians, including women and children, have allegedly been killed since the beginning of May 2014. Heavy fighting continued at front lines in north-west Aleppo city and around key supply routes in rural Aleppo. Analysis of satellite imagery by Human Rights Watch shows continued heavy air and ground bombardment by Government forces on opposition-held districts in the city of Aleppo between 23 May and 6 June 2014. The majority of the 130 major damage sites identified by Human Rights Watch are strongly consistent with air strikes and specifically the impact of barrel bombs dropped from helicopters, striking predominantly residential neighbourhoods. The impact on civilians and

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infrastructure has been severe. On 28 May, for example, more than 40 people, including women and children, were killed as a result of air raids using barrel bombs over areas under opposition control in eastern Aleppo city.

5. In Dar'a, intensification of aerial bombardment during the reporting period by Government forces displaced at least 2,000 people and reportedly killed approximately 160 civilians, including some 65 women and children. Hundreds of barrel bombs were dropped on Dar'a during May. On 22 May, three mortars landed on a tent hosting a pro-government election rally in the Al Matar neighbourhood of Dar'a city, resulting in 43 people killed and many injured.

6. In Rif Dimashq, ongoing aerial bombardment and shelling around the opposition-held eastern Ghouta town of Al Mleiha led to a large displacement of the civilian population; of the estimated 20,000 people who were living in Al Mleiha, only 5,000 remain at most. The intensified use of barrel bombs was reported in Khan al-Shih area, causing civilian casualties and massive infrastructure damage.

7. An escalation of fighting between Government and opposition forces in eastern and western rural Deir ez-Zor led to the closure of road access into and out of Deir ez-Zor city, resulting in shortages of food and fuel supplies. This included an intensification of shelling, particularly on Deir ez-Zor city neighbourhoods under control of the Free Syrian Army. Infighting between opposition groups also intensified, as the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS) gained ground in the east of the governorate, causing approximately 125,000 residents to flee to Al Mayadeen and surrounding villages.

8. Heavy fighting also continued in Idlib around key front lines, and several opposition-held villages in the western rural part of the governorate sustained shelling and air strikes. On 7 June, the Bab al-Hawa area hospital in the Harim district was reportedly targeted by two rockets.

9. The United Nations remains unable to provide a verified assessment of the presence and activity of non-Syrian fighters on a nationwide scale. On 25 May, a citizen of the United States of America was involved in a suicide bombing in the Syrian Arab Republic. Following the incident, the United States underscored its concern about the flow of foreign fighters into and out of the Syrian Arab Republic and emphasized that they were working with key partner Governments in a focused outreach effort to address this issue. During the reporting period, ISIS expanded its operations across Syrian and Iraqi borders, reportedly bolstered by a number of foreign fighters. The recent advancement of ISIS in Iraq is expected to have a direct impact on the eastern governorates of the Syrian Arab Republic, including Deir ez-Zor and Ar Raqqah, and may strengthen the presence of extremist groups in ISIS-controlled areas of the Syrian Arab Republic.

10. There was no progress made towards the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué during the reporting period. On 3 June, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic held presidential elections, in which no opposition candidate ran. The elections were held outside the framework of the Geneva process.

B. Human rights

11. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to receive reports of arbitrary

arrest and detention, torture and ill treatment, allegedly perpetrated by members of the Syrian security apparatus, including military intelligence, political security, State security and air force intelligence. OHCHR received information indicating that, between 22 May and 2 June, 11 detainees died as a result of torture in several Government-run detention facilities in Hama, including at the Air Force Intelligence Branch and Deir Shmayel Detention Centre. The Government has yet to put in place a mechanism to investigate serious and credible allegations of torture. This is of particular concern when large numbers of men, women and children are thought to be held in detention facilities across the country amid consistent and ongoing reports of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

12. On 22 May, Syrian armed forces entered Aleppo Central Prison, breaking through the siege imposed by several armed opposition groups, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra, since mid-2013. The Government regained control over the whole prison complex. During the last week of May, the entire prison population, amounting to an estimated 2,500 inmates, was reportedly transferred to alternate makeshift places of detention in the city, primarily al-Wahda School and Ibn Khaldoun Hospital. Information obtained by OHCHR indicates that conditions in these places of detention continue to be inhumane.

13. On 24 May, 53 political detainees who had been held by the Syrian authorities prior to 2011 were transferred from the prison. As at 9 June, families of the detainees had not received any information on the location or conditions of detention of these 53 men, raising concerns for their safety. Those transferred from the prison included approximately 150 detainees who were arrested by security forces in connection with anti-government protests since 2011. Many of the detainees were reportedly not brought before a judge or afforded defence counsel at any stage during their detention. On 4 June, the Government released approximately 300 prisoners from Central Aleppo Prison, who had been arbitrarily detained after having already served their sentences.

14. On 9 June, President Bashar al-Assad issued Legislative Decree 22 of 2014, granting a general amnesty for crimes committed before 9 June. According to the Syrian news agency, the decree stipulates that some sentences will be reduced, such as death penalties to life imprisonment. It further provides that some sentences will be commuted, including the entire duration of the sentence for prisoners with terminal illnesses and for those aged over 70 years. The amnesty also applies to foreigners who entered the Syrian Arab Republic "with the purpose of joining a terrorist group or committing a terrorist act" if they present themselves to the Government within a month, as well as to army deserters. Unverified reports at the governorate level suggest that by 15 June at least 860 prisoners were released under this amnesty.

15. On 29 May, at least 15 civilians, including 7 women and 3 children, were allegedly killed by armed opposition groups in the town of Teliliye in Al Hasakeh governorate. The killing occurred during fighting between ISIS and People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) to gain control of the area. Dozens of combatants on both sides were also reportedly killed. Internet-based footage depicted images of bodies of women and children lined up on the ground after apparently having been shot, suggesting that they were massacred. According to activists interviewed by OHCHR, all 15 of the deceased were internally displaced

persons, who had fled violence in Aleppo. Both ISIS and YPG have accused one another of perpetrating the massacre.

16. On 21 May, Jabhat al-Nusra reportedly executed three ISIS combatants captured that day in clashes around Al Tewamiya in Deir ez-Zor governorate.

17. Internet-based footage and photographs appear to depict Mohammad Mohammad, a 26-year-old man, being beheaded on 23 May by ISIS combatants in the town of Al Shuyouk in Hasakeh governorate. Activists who knew the victim report that he was not a combatant. According to information received by OHCHR, he was among a number of people, including women, captured on 23 May at an ISIS checkpoint outside the village of Jubb al-Faraj, Al Hasakeh. No information has been received by OHCHR on the fate of the others captured.

18. On 30 May, while on the road to Ein al-Arab, Aleppo, over 200 civilians, the majority of them high school students, were allegedly abducted by ISIS combatants. The students were reportedly on their way home from the city of Al Bab, Aleppo, where they had sat school examinations. The same day, ISIS released approximately 125 female students. As at 9 June, more than 100 male students reportedly continued to be held by ISIS.

19. Four videos posted on the Internet on 30 May, purportedly by armed opposition groups, depict 54 hostages, all women and children, allegedly being held in Idlib since their capture by armed opposition groups on 4 August 2013, during an attack on a village in northern Ladhiqiyah. Some 40 other hostages, also captured during the same attack, were released by armed groups on 7 and 8 May. According to activists in northern Ladhiqiyah, at least 100 more civilians remain unaccounted for since the attack.

20. During the reporting period, the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, OHCHR and United Nations human rights mechanisms, including special procedures mandate holders, continued to be denied access to the Syrian Arab Republic.

C. Humanitarian access

21. The humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic has further deteriorated. Latest estimates indicate that the number of people in need has now reached 10.8 million, an increase of 17 per cent (or 1.5 million), approximately 6.4 million of whom are internally displaced. The current estimate of 3.5 million people residing in areas that are difficult or impossible for humanitarian actors to reach has also risen, likely to be up to 4.7 million people. For the purpose of this report, all monitoring figures are based on 3.5 million. This includes at least 241,000 people who live in areas that are besieged by either Government or opposition forces.

22. There has been no improvement in achieving sustained humanitarian access to all people in need within the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular those in hard-to-reach areas. New Government truck-sealing procedures introduced in April failed to improve the reach of humanitarian aid, and in fact resulted in fewer people being reached in May. The Government subsequently imposed additional clearance requirements, further undermining access to people in desperate need of assistance. By 9 June, only 12 per cent of the planned 4.25 million people in the World Food

Programme (WFP) food dispatch plan were reached in comparison to 26 per cent at the same time in April.

23. While deliveries of chlorine in all 14 governorates benefited 16.5 million people with clean water, other critical types of humanitarian assistance, including food, have not been allowed consistent entry to hard-to-reach areas. WFP delivered food assistance to nearly 3.3 million people across all 14 governorates in May, but overall during the reporting period assistance reached only 33 (or 12.6 per cent) of the 262 locations identified as being hard to reach or besieged. This included food and nutrition assistance provided by WFP, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to 348,819 people (10 per cent of 3.5 million); and non-food items for 268,960 people (7.7 per cent of 3.5 million).

24. Eight opposition groups[a] have signed a declaration of commitments in which they declared to respect and uphold fundamental humanitarian principles, abide by international humanitarian law and commit to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Six of the groups signed within the reporting period.

Besieged areas

25. Approximately 241,000 people remain besieged; 196,000 in areas that are besieged by Government forces in Madamiyet Elsham, eastern Ghouta, Darayya and Yarmouk, and 45,000 in areas besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra.

26. During the reporting period, United Nations assistance only reached two besieged communities: Yarmouk and Douma. Food was delivered to 2,467 people, or 1 per cent, and non-food items to 17,204 people, or 7 per cent of people in these besieged areas. UNICEF also distributed nutritional assistance to 3,600 beneficiaries in Douma in the form of fortified spread and cartons of High Energy Biscuits.

27. Eastern Ghouta: 150,000 people remain besieged in eastern Ghouta. On 24 May, a convoy to Douma was approved with reduced amounts of relief supplies. Food and non-food items were delivered to 2,000 people and medicines for 22,600 people. In addition UNICEF provided nutrition assistance to 3,600 beneficiaries and water, sanitation and hygiene assistance to 2,000 beneficiaries; 27,346 beneficiaries did not receive surgical items that had been prepared for delivery, while critical medicines for another 27,435 people were reported absent from the final convoy. While on the ground, the team observed a noticeable deterioration in the humanitarian situation since their last mission on 29 March, in particular with regard to health, nutrition and water. Hundreds of civilians gather daily at Government checkpoints but continue to be barred from exiting the area.

28. Madamiyet Elsham: 20,000 people remain besieged in Madamiyet Elsham. Since 1 January 2014, the United Nations has submitted 12 requests for Government authorization to access Madamiyet Elsham through inter-agency convoys. Out of those, four requests were approved, one was denied in writing and all the others remain unanswered. Despite the approval of four inter-agency convoys, thus far none of the attempts have resulted in the successful delivery of any humanitarian assistance inside Madamiyet Elsham because of Government refusals to allow

[a] Mujahadeen Army (7 June); Idlib Military Council (5 June); 101 Infantry Division (5 June); Fursan al-Haqq, Idlib (5 June); Hizm Movement (27 May); Jabhat al-Asali wa al-Tanmiya (21 May); Syria Revolutionaries Front (14 April); and PYD (23 April).

convoys to proceed. Madamiyet Elsham has not been reached with assistance since October 2012, except for polio vaccinations.

29. Yarmouk: 18,000 people remain besieged in Yarmouk. UNRWA was permitted to conduct distributions on nine days, delivering 350 food parcels — enough for 467 people for one month — and 3,801 hygiene kits for 15,204 people, during the reporting period. The Syrian authorities continue to refuse to authorize UNRWA to dispatch and distribute medical supplies in Yarmouk, with the exception of small quantities of rehydration salts, mineral supplements, vitamins and polio vaccines.

30. Darayya: An estimated 8,000 people in Darayya have been besieged by pro-Government forces since November 2012. Preliminary negotiations for a cessation of hostilities agreement in Darayya are ongoing, but significant differences remain between the parties. Increased hostilities and heavy shelling, including the reported use of barrel bombs, have taken place in Darayya over the past month. Darayya was last assisted in January 2013.

31. Nubul and Zahra: 45,000 people remain besieged by opposition forces in Nubul and Zahra. Following the successful convoy to the two towns on 8 May, a two-month convoy plan has been approved by the Governor of Aleppo. Written approval by the Governor was received only for the first month.

Cross-border assistance

32. There has been no development since the United Nations sought the consent of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in March 2014 to use additional border crossings in order to facilitate greater access to those in need in hard-to-reach areas.

Free passage of medical supplies, personnel and equipment

33. The delivery of urgently required medicines and medical supplies continued to be obstructed during the reporting period, the most significant obstacle being the decision by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to prohibit the delivery of specific life-saving supplies as a matter of policy. This, combined with insecurity and other bureaucratic obstacles, has meant that the overall delivery of supplies is only a fraction of what is required and there is a very uneven distribution between Government and opposition-controlled areas, the latter receiving only 25 per cent of the quantities distributed in the first three months of 2014.

34. Medicines and medical equipment continued to be removed from World Health Organization (WHO) convoys entering opposition-controlled areas. In some cases, even prior to the submission of distribution lists for opposition-controlled areas, WHO had been warned by local or national authorities that if plans included injectable or surgical items, the required approvals would not be granted. Once plans are approved, convoys are then subjected to additional checks prior to departure by national security officials, at which stage medicines approved by central authorities are further removed. During a recent inter-agency convoy to Homs, for example, medicines (mainly antibiotics) were removed from the convoy traveling to the hard-to-reach area of Ar Rastan. That meant that 2,116 beneficiaries were denied urgently needed medicines. Many of the same medicines were allowed into Government-controlled areas on the same day.

35. Physicians for Human Rights reported that 29 medical personnel were killed during May, the highest number in a month since the start of the conflict, bringing

their total number of recorded deaths of medical personnel to 502. Of the 29 medical personnel, 27 were killed by actions of Government forces and 2 by opposition armed groups: 16 were killed by shelling and bombing, 8 by torture and 4 from shooting; and 1 was executed by ISIS. Physicians for Human Rights has also corroborated 153 attacks on 127 different medical facilities since the start of the war, including 3 hospitals in April 2014. All three hospitals attacked in April were hit by barrel bombs — two in Aleppo city and one in Dar'a.

36. Final results for the May polio immunization round indicate that over 2.8 million children under five years were reached during the campaign in all of the country's 14 governorates. The lowest reported coverage, in Rif Dimashq (86.4 per cent) and Deir ez-Zor (75.4 per cent), was due to the deteriorating security situations in those governorates. The overall coverage was 97.4 per cent of the target population.

Administrative procedures

37. The Government's new truck-sealing procedures improved the security of the cargo by helping to prevent petty pilferage at checkpoints. However, considerable delays were experienced during the first two weeks of May, when the new mechanism was rolled out. On 29 May, a streamlined facilitation letter for regular programming was agreed and circulated by the Government. The new procedures do not apply to deliveries of medical supplies or to humanitarian deliveries of assistance to opposition and contested areas, all of which must be negotiated on ad hoc basis. In mid-June, challenges were still being encountered at checkpoints and security personnel in charge of monitoring the sealing process failed to be present at warehouses in a number of instances (for example, Kiswah), despite the fact that the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator had submitted an updated list of all United Nations and international non-government organizations' warehouses.

38. These new procedures resulted in reduced access overall, but particularly in the health sector, leading to significant delays in the distribution of supplies required to respond to disease outbreaks for which advance planning cannot be carried out. Previous approval procedures, applied through the Ministry of Health, are no longer accepted at Government checkpoints, and new requirements for additional approval letters, truck sealing and Government oversight are not consistently applied. In early June, WHO requested the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to exempt health items from the new procedures applied to aid delivery.

39. The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since indicated its intent to introduce additional clearance procedures for regular programme deliveries, including a requirement that approvals for all United Nations deliveries be made under a unified monthly plan submitted by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator. On 29 May, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated that a new facilitation letter would be required for customs procedures. The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator submitted a note verbale on 13 June clarifying that a unified plan was not feasible, that the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan is the framework for the humanitarian response, and that additional facilitation letters for supplies imported into the Syrian Arab Republic would cause delays and additional financial burdens for agencies.

40. The Ministry of Social Affairs also informed governors that as of immediate effect, all convoys or missions to opposition and contested areas will now require the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Relief Committee and the National Security Office. Prior to this, in line with the Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan strategy, in areas where hubs are approved, the governors were delegated to coordinate and authorize delivery of assistance within their respective governorates, including across lines of conflict. The High Relief Committee and the National Security Office have not previously been involved in providing facilitation letters at any level. These new restrictions, if enforced, will result in lengthier, rather than reduced, approval processes.

41. As at 11 June, a total of 82 United Nations visas or renewal requests remained pending, 40 within the 15 working day limit and 42 exceeding the 15 working days. There has been no progress in obtaining visas for international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with 13 visa requests still pending.

42. During the reporting period, two additional national non-governmental organizations were approved to work with United Nations agencies by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one was removed from the list. The number of national non-governmental organizations currently authorized to partner directly with the United Nations is now 85, working through 142 national branches.

Safety and security of staff and premises

43. Deteriorating security and direct attacks on aid workers continued during the reporting period, most notably on 24 May, when a warehouse run by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) in Douma was attacked while the United Nations team was present. One SARC driver was injured and several civilians were killed. During the reporting period a SARC special needs project office was also shelled, killing 1 SARC volunteer.

44. Twenty-nine United Nations staff (27 UNRWA and 2 UNDP) are currently detained, of which four are missing.

Observations

45. Every month I report to the Council the thousands of people killed, displaced and traumatized by aerial bombardments, mortar attacks, kidnappings and executions, many in densely populated areas. Even children traveling for school exams, perhaps the most poignant display of hope in the midst of this relentless war, are not exempt from the violent and indiscriminate actions of the parties. Arbitrary arrests, torture in detention and attacks on hospitals and health-care workers continue and are part of the everyday fabric of life of many Syrians. But they should not be. As I have said to this Council before, there are rules that govern the conduct of war, and these rules are being flagrantly violated every day.

46. I am particularly concerned that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, a signatory to the Charter of the United Nations, continues to indiscriminately drop hundreds of barrel bombs on defenceless men, women and children in populated neighbourhoods. I am equally concerned at the relentless and indiscriminate use of mortar and shelling of residential neighbourhoods by armed opposition groups. These actions are flagrant violations of international law. The deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime.

47. Efforts to expand humanitarian assistance to those most in need have been met with continued delays and obstruction. Continued insecurity and the absence of agreements between parties that could facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance have played their part in this delay, as has the refusal by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to ease the bureaucratic obstacles imposed on humanitarian work. Far from improving access, new procedures rolled out two months ago have resulted in more delays and have reduced the reach of humanitarian partners further. Revised clearance measures now being proposed by the Government will only solidify that trend. I remind the parties to this conflict that their obligation to allow and facilitate access for humanitarian assistance is not negotiable. It is demanded by the Security Council, by international humanitarian law and by the most basic commitment to human decency shared by millions of people across the world. United Nations agencies and their partners must be allowed rapid and unhindered access to all Syrians in need.

48. It is inhumane and unlawful that medicines and medical supplies continue to be routinely prevented entry into opposition held areas, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. There is no possible justification for the official restrictions being imposed by the Government on surgical equipment and injectable. Tens of thousands of civilians are being arbitrarily denied urgent and life-saving medical care. The denial of basic and widely accepted humanitarian commodities is a deliberate tactic of war aimed at denying help and support to those most in need.

49. As stipulated by the Council in resolution 2139 (2014), humanitarian actors must be allowed to reach those in need by all routes available, both line and border crossings. As stated in my most recent report (S/2014/365), the United Nations is ready to put in place speedy, pragmatic and practical arrangements at critical border crossings to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in accordance with assessed and established needs and the obligations under resolution 2139 (2014). Such arrangements would allow United Nations convoys to cross the border into the Syrian Arab Republic, in their own vehicles, without the need for specific permits or visas, to deliver urgently needed relief to people in need.

50. While the parties to this conflict are responsible for upholding their obligations under international law, the members of the Security Council and other Member States with influence can and must do more to demand that the violence end, that sieges are lifted and that vital humanitarian assistance reaches all areas of the country.

51. In my report of 22 May (S/2014/365), I informed the Council that the demands of resolution 2139 (2014) were not being heeded, and that the resolution had yet to make a meaningful difference in the lives of millions of people.

52. I therefore call upon the Council, in the strongest terms, to honour the humanitarian imperative of saving lives and meeting urgent humanitarian needs, wherever they occur.

Annex

1. Protection of civilians[a]

Examples of attacks on civilian facilities (schools, hospitals, camps, places of worship)

Attacks on schools during the reporting period

- On 4 June, one mortar landed on the Faculty of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering in Damascus. No casualties were reported.
- On 3 June, 3 civilians were killed and 25 allegedly injured as a result of three mortars landing in Dar'a city; one mortar landed on the Faculty of Education.
- On 29 May, local media reported that a grenade exploded in Zat al-Nitaqain School in the Al Nasera neighbourhood in Al Hasakeh city, causing material damage. No casualties were reported.
- On 29 May, ISIS kidnapped approximately 225 Kurdish students who were returning to opposition-held Ein al-Arab after completing their academic preparatory certificate examinations in Government-held areas of Aleppo city. Reports indicate that 125 female students were released on the same day, while more than 100 male students are still being held. The students were forced to undertake risky cross-line travel to sit the examinations, as the Government did not allow the students to take the examinations in Ein al-Arab.

Large-scale impact of conflict on public services

- The current education enrolment rate in the Syrian Arab Republic ranks as the second-worst in the world, with more than half of all school-age children (51.8 per cent) no longer attending school. The out-of-school rate reached above 90 per cent in Ar Raqqah and Aleppo and 68 per cent in Rif Dimashq.
- The conflict continued to disrupt health-care services, including dire shortages of essential medicines, supplies and health-care workers, especially those trained in emergency care. Hospitals and health-care facilities have been damaged in 12 of the country's 14 governorates, and they face an array of obstacles that severely affect their ability to function, including lack of fuel and electricity. Out of 97 Ministry of Health hospitals:
  - 47 per cent are reported as fully functioning; 30 per cent are reported as partially functioning; and 28 per cent are reported as not functioning at all
  - 71 per cent are accessible to people in need; 21 per cent are not accessible; and the status of accessibility for 7 per cent of hospitals is unknown
  - 62 per cent of ambulances have been damaged or destroyed.
- On 8 June, ISIS cut water and electricity to Deir ez-Zor.
- Following an explosion on 2 June, which damaged two main water pipelines, 1 million people were left without regular water supply in Baghdad Station,

[a] The United Nations has a distinct and regular mechanism of reporting on the six grave violations against children in armed conflict that has set verification standards and periodicity of reporting to identify trends.

Al Ashrafia, New and Old Al Seriyan and Old Aleppo in Aleppo governorate. SARC is negotiating with armed opposition groups in the area for its maintenance teams to gain access. It will take three weeks to repair the pipelines.

Economic impact of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic[b]

- Seventy-five per cent of Syrians live in poverty, with more than half of the population living in extreme poverty. Approximately 20 per cent of people live in "abject poverty", unable to meet basic food needs for their daily survival. Estimates indicate that one third of the population of Idlib and Deir ez-Zor lives below the "abject poverty" line, as does a quarter of the population of Aleppo and Dar'a.
- The economic loss from the conflict is estimated to be $143.6 billion, equivalent to 276 per cent of the national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010. The current national GDP is estimated to be only one third of what it would have been in the absence of the conflict.

2. Safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need

Hard-to-reach areas

- Latest estimates indicate that the number of people located in "hard-to-reach" areas has risen from 3.5 million to 4.7 million.[c]
- Food assistance was provided to 348,799 people during the reporting period (318,105 by WFP and 20,447 by UNRWA). UNICEF provided nutritional supplies to 10,247 people.
- UNRWA distributed food assistance to 20,467 people in hard-to-reach areas during the reporting period (20,000 in Neirab and 467 in Yarmouk).
- Non-food items were provided to 268,960 people (7.7 per cent of 3.5 million) during the reporting period. From 20 May to 11 June, UNHCR provided 243,180 people with non-food assistance in hard-to-reach areas. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided 5,000 hygiene kits to 12,150 people in hard-to-reach areas, while UNICEF provided non-food items to 13,630 people in need.
- WHO distributed medicines and supplies for over 398,217 people in need in hard-to-reach or besieged areas.
- UNICEF reached 37,180 people with water, sanitation and hygiene items and 20,065 children with educational support in hard-to-reach areas.

[b] Syria Centre for Policy Research, Syria Squandering Humanity: Socioeconomic Monitoring Report on Syria, combined third and fourth quarter (July-December 2013), (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and United Nations Development Programme, May 2014).

[c] While latest estimates indicate that the number of people in "hard-to-reach" areas has increased, monitoring and reporting for the reporting period was completed on the basis of the 3.5 million figure. United Nations agencies will monitor and report against the 4.7 million figure from the next reporting period onwards.

- UNFPA distributed 11,844 female and 6,500 male dignity kits; and IOM provided 5,000 hygiene kits to 12,150 people in hard-to-reach areas.

Inter-agency convoys

- Three inter-agency convoys took place during the reporting period:
  - On 29 May 15 trucks delivered food assistance for nearly 30,000 people, non-food items for 10,000 people and medicines for 15,000 patients to the SARC warehouses in Orem al-Kubra in rural Aleppo. Syrian Arab Red Crescent sub-branches subsequently distributed the supplies in Orem al-Kubra, Afrin, Azaz and Tel Rifat.
  - On 28 May 20 trucks reached Ar Rastan (opposition-controlled) and 8 reached Akradisneh and Ein el-Nisr (Government areas), providing food and non-food items to 60,500 people and medical items for 48,270. Some medical items destined for Ar Rastan, which would have assisted an additional 2,116 people, were removed.
  - On 24 May a joint United Nations/SARC accompanied convoy to Douma delivered food and non-food items to 2,000 people and medicines to 22,600. Owing to security and crowd control concerns at the original agreed distribution point, supplies were offloaded and repackaged at a warehouse run by SARC inside the city to ensure orderly distribution. During the offloading of the first truck, two mortars fell in close proximity of the warehouse. Soon after, the warehouse was hit again, resulting in the death of several people and the injury of eight people, including one SARC driver who sustained injuries due to the blast.
- Two inter-agency convoys were requested but did not take place during the reporting period:
  - On 25 May, an inter-agency convoy to Adraa Balad and Adraa Omalieh, Rif Dimashq, carrying emergency supplies including food, non-food items, hygiene materials and medicines for 600 families (300 in Adraa Balad and 300 in Adraa Omalieh) did not take place owing to security concerns, including the attack on the convoy in Douma on 24 May. Although originally scheduled for 5 April, the mission was postponed until 25 May owing to the delay in obtaining authorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
  - Rural west Hama: no feedback was received from the Governor of Hama on the request submitted by the United Nations hub in Homs on 22 April and the reminder letter sent on 15 May to conduct a mission to rural west Hama. The United Nations hub in Homs conducted a mission to Hama on 28 May to follow up with the governor.

Besieged areas

- 241,000 people remain besieged in total.
- During the reporting period, food assistance was delivered to 2,467 people, or 1 per cent of people in besieged areas, and non-food items to 17,204, or 7 per cent of people in besieged areas.

- UNICEF provided nutritional assistance to 3,600 beneficiaries in Douma, and WHO delivered medicines for 22,600 people in Douma.
- UNRWA delivered 350 food parcels and hygiene kits for 15,204 people to Yarmouk. Authorities continued to refuse to authorize UNRWA to dispatch and distribute medical supplies, with the exception of small amounts of rehydration salts, mineral supplements, vitamins and polio vaccines.

Cross-border assistance

From Turkey

- According to the Turkish Red Crescent Society, humanitarian actors have channelled about $23 million worth of humanitarian assistance on average monthly from Turkey to the Syrian Arab Republic through the zero-point delivery system administered by the Turkish Red Crescent Society. This monthly average does not include assistance delivered through commercial or other channels.

From Jordan

- The Al Naseeb border crossing between Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic remained open for the transportation of relief items during the reporting period, although insecurity continued to prevent direct cross-line deliveries of relief items from As Sweida to Dar'a governorate.
- During the reporting period, UNHCR submitted 38 official requests for importation of core relief items, with 37 approved and 1 pending. In 2014, approved requests have resulted in 461 UNHCR trucks entering the Syrian Arab Republic from Jordan.
- UNICEF imported sodium hydrochloride and kits for newborn babies through 29 trucks entering from Jordan.

From Lebanon

- The Masna and Al Arida border crossings between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic remained open for the transportation of relief items during the reporting period.
- UNHCR submitted 17 requests to transport core relief items, medicine and telecommunications and security equipment across the Lebanese border, with 13 approved. Four requests, related to telecommunications and security equipment, remain outstanding.
- UNICEF imported various shipments through Lebanon, including polio vaccines, cold chains and medical supplies.
- It is estimated that other humanitarian actors transport relatively small amounts of assistance from Lebanon to the Syrian Arab Republic through other channels. Items coming from Lebanon tend to be less voluminous (medicines, information technology equipment and security equipment) and often do not require individual trucks, and enter the country by courier service.

From Iraq

- The United Nations has requested the use of the Al Yaroubiyeh crossing between Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic for the importation of relief items. Initial approval to transport items through the crossing was received in November 2013; however, the approval remains conditional on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regaining control of the crossing from PYD.

Safety of humanitarian workers

- On 12 June, five mortars impacted near the UNRWA Aleppo area office. There were no reports of staff injured or property damaged.
- On 6 June, SARC reported the death of a SARC volunteer after the shelling of a project office in Ar Rastan.
- On 4 June, one national staff member reported minor property damage following mortar incidents in Abou Roumaneh in Damascus city.
- On 3 June, several mortar incidents around Damascus city led to minor property damage to two national staff houses in Al Maliky and in Pakistan Street.
- On 27 May, a fact-finding mission-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons/United Nations Department of Safety and Security convoy was hit by an improvised explosive device on the road to Kfar Zita near Taybet el-Imam town in Hama governorate. The driver of the vehicle received minor injuries. A second vehicle was impacted by small arms fire with minor damage.
- On 25 May, a few stray bullets landed in the vicinity of the UNHCR office in Kfar Souseh, with some bullets hitting the inside of the building. No injuries were reported.
- On 24 May, a warehouse run by SARC in Douma was targeted while the United Nations team was present in Douma town, killing several, and injuring a SARC driver.
- On 22 May, one UNRWA staff member received minor injuries following shelling on Khan Dannoun.
- 28 United Nations national staff members continue to be detained or missing (27 from UNRWA are detained or missing and one from UNDP is detained).
- Syrian humanitarian workers continued to face a number of risks, including summary executions, kidnappings, arrests, violence and harassment. In addition to the one SARC volunteer having been killed during the reporting period, SARC also confirmed the death of two volunteers from incidents that occurred in April. The total number of humanitarian workers killed since March 2011 is 59. This includes 14 United Nations staff members, 37 SARC staff members and volunteers, 7 Palestine Red Crescent Society volunteers and staff members and 1 international NGO staff member.

Declaration of Commitment on Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance

- A total of eight armed opposition groups have signed the Declaration of Commitment, affirming their core responsibilities under international humanitarian law and of their commitment to facilitate action to meet the needs of civilians on the basis of need alone. Of the eight signatories, six groups signed during the reporting period:
  - Mujahadeen Army: signed 7 June
  - Idlib Military Council: signed 5 June
  - 101st Infantry Division: signed 5 June
  - Fursan al-Haqq (Idlib): signed 5 June
  - Hizm Movement: signed 27 May
  - Jabhat al-Asali wa al-Tanmiya: signed 21 May
  - Syria Revolutionaries Front: signed 14 April
  - PYD: signed 23 April

3. Safe passage of medical personnel and supplies

Attacks on medical facilities during the reporting period

- On 7 June, Bab al-Hawa hospital in Harim, Idlib, was targeted by two rockets. No casualties or damage were reported.
- On 4 June, one mortar landed near Badie Amouda Hospital in the Abu Roumaneh neighbourhood in Damascus. No casualties or damage were reported.

Removal of medicines and medical supplies from convoys

- During the reporting period, medicines and medical equipment for approximately 57,000 people in hard-to-reach areas was removed from WHO convoys owing to lack of approval, removal, or diversion of supplies. This included:
  - Surgical items for 27,346 beneficiaries and critical medicines for another 27,435 to Douma on 24 May.
  - Medicines for 2,116 people in Ar Rastan, Homs. Many of the same medicines were permitted to the Government-controlled areas Akradisneh and Ein el-Nisr on the same day.

Polio vaccination campaign

- As at 9 June 2014, there were 36 confirmed cases of polio.
- Final results for the sixth country-wide polio vaccination campaign (4-8 May) indicated that over 2.8 million children under five were reached in all 14 governorates. The lowest reported coverage, in Rif Dimashq (86.4 per cent) and Deir ez-Zor (75.4 per cent), was due to the deteriorating security situations

in those governorates. The overall coverage was 97.4 per cent. The next polio round, which commenced on 15 June and will last until 19 June, targets 2.9 million children, with the results expected during the next reporting period.

Measles vaccination campaign

- During the reporting period, the Ministry of Health confirmed a measles outbreak in the Syrian Arab Republic, with 160 cases in eight governorates: Deir ez-Zor, Ar Raqqah, Ladhiqiyah, Homs, Idlib, Aleppo, Hama and Al Hasakeh. In total, over 2,000 suspected cases of measles have been reported in the first half of 2014, double the number of reported cases for the whole of 2013.

- A measles vaccination campaign led by the Ministry of Health will run from 15 to 26 June, which is aimed at reaching between 700,000 and 1 million children aged between 6 months and 10 years. The measles campaign aims to reach high-risk districts in Aleppo, Idlib, Ar Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hasakeh, Rif Dimashq, Homs, and Ladhiqiyah. UNICEF imported over 1.3 million doses of the measles vaccine on 29 May and delivered 6.5 million doses of vitamin A to the Ministry of Health to be used during the campaign.

4. Administrative hurdles

Clearance procedures for convoys

- On 27 April, the Government communicated a new procedure for unaccompanied truck clearance, whereby trucks are "sealed" at warehouses and not searched at checkpoints. The new measure improved the security of the cargo, but a lack of clarity by security forces resulted in significant delays throughout May and June.

- On 22 May, Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued new instructions that each organization needs to submit a further facilitation letter for each truck to the governor in the governorate where the warehouses are located.

- On 29 May, a new procedure for the importation of goods was issued. The new procedure includes the introduction of a facilitation letter, as for the sealing procedure for trucks, as well as approval from the local governor and weekly importation/loading plans.

- On 9 June, the Ministry of Social Affairs communicated to governors that all convoys or missions to "hot spot areas" (that is, cross-line locations) now require the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Relief Committee and the National Security Office. Previously, the governors were delegated to authorize and coordinate delivery of assistance within their governorates, including across conflict lines, in areas where hubs are approved. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated its intent to require the United Nations to provide comprehensive monthly implementation plans for discussion.

Clearance procedures for telecommunications equipment

- Although Government approvals to import and operate information and communications technology equipment remain a lengthy process, UNHCR has obtained approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for all requested items, including VHF radios, VSAT for Qamishli and some information technology equipment. The only exception is for Thuraya handheld satellite phones. UNHCR has submitted the required supporting documentation to obtain licenses for the Thuraya phones, including the list of staff that will be using them; however, final approval has yet to be received.

Empowered interlocutors

- Government of the Syrian Arab Republic: The joint United Nations and Government of the Syrian Arab Republic working group established following the adoption of resolution 2139 (2014) includes a security focal point. Regular meetings are taking place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Humanitarian Coordinator on an almost daily basis.
- The opposition is still unable to designate empowered interlocutors. The fragmented nature of the opposition makes it difficult to have a clear identified interlocutor for armed opposition groups. Ad hoc local engagement is ongoing to negotiate access. Interlocutors vary depending on the localities where access is being negotiated.

Visas

- The revised visa policy established by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 4 March continued to be implemented. As at 11 June, a total of 82 United Nations visas or renewal requests remained pending, 40 within the 15 working day limit and 42 exceeding the 15 working days. There has been no progress in obtaining visas for international NGO staff, with 13 visa requests still pending.

Humanitarian hubs and presence

- UNHCR opened an office at the Qamishli hub.
- The Aleppo hub is still operating and is currently staffed with international and national staff.
- The Government has approved As Sweida as a hub; however, approval is still pending for the request to establish a hub in Dar'a.
- UNICEF established a warehouse in Ladhiqiyah governorate during the last week of May. The strategic location of the warehouse will ease the dispatch of supplies to governorates covered under the Tartous, Homs and Aleppo hubs.

International NGO partners

- No new international NGOs requested approval to work in the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period.
- The number of international NGOs approved to work in the Syrian Arab Republic stands at 16.

- International NGOs are still not authorized to work directly with national NGOs and are not allowed to accompany United Nations convoys to the field.
- There was no progress during the reporting period on the revision of the standard memorandum of understanding for international NGOs with SARC and line ministries.

National NGO partners

- The overall number of national NGOs authorized to partner directly with United Nations agencies increased to 85, operating through 142 national branches.
- During the reporting period, two new national NGOs were approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to partner with United Nations organizations: one in Damascus governorate and one in Homs governorate.
- One national NGO in Tartous was excluded from relief work with United Nations agencies and international organizations during the reporting period.

5. Funding

- $381.1 million of funding for the Syrian crisis was registered during the reporting period. Of that amount, $208.6 million was for activities inside the Syrian Arab Republic and $172.5 million was for support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries.
- Of the total amount reported for the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period, 20 per cent ($42.4 million) was for activities included in the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan. For neighbouring countries, 94 per cent ($162.2 million) of the amount reported was for activities included in the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan.
- As at 17 June, the total funding for the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan stood at 29 per cent ($6.5 billion requested, $1.9 billion received) with the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 26 per cent funded and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan 31 per cent funded.

6. Overview of United Nations humanitarian response

Food assistance

- In the May 2014 dispatch cycle, WFP dispatched food in support of nearly 3.3 million people across all 14 governorates of the Syrian Arab Republic. Inter-agency convoys to rural parts of Homs (Ar Rastan and Akradisneh), Douma in Rif Dimashq and Aleppo facilitated the delivery of food rations in support of 88,750 people. However, the total food dispatch for May represented a 14 per cent decrease compared to the April cycle when food was dispatched in support of over 3.8 million beneficiaries. Food dispatches experienced significant delays in May owing to continued insecurity and the new Government convoy procedures. For example, in Ar Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor, only 30 and 8 per cent of the dispatch plan was achieved, respectively, in

May, owing to continued insecurity. However, for Ar Raqqah, this was an improvement in access compared to April, when none of the planned assistance reached the governorate.

- In June, with implementation of the new transport facilitation system still under development, food dispatches continued at a slower pace. By 15 June, only 25 per cent of the WFP food dispatch plan was achieved, representing a 10 per cent decline from the same period in April.

Core relief items and shelter

- UNHCR has distributed over 8.1 million core relief items to over 2.2 million beneficiaries in 13 out of the 14 governorates since the beginning of 2014.
- UNHCR upgraded private shelters for 20,983 beneficiaries in Homs, Rif Dimashq and Aleppo governorates. In addition, UNHCR completed the shelter rehabilitation of collective shelters in six governorates, benefitting 7,780 people.

Health

- WHO delivered antibiotics and medical equipment, including six water purification units, for over 286,817 people in the hard-to-reach area of Deir ez-Zor.
- WHO, in support of Syrian Arab Red Crescent and local health authorities, delivered medical supplies for 138,145 people in Aleppo and medical supplies and medicines to over 22,600 people in the besieged areas of Douma.
- WHO distributed intravenous fluids for 76,401 beneficiaries in health facilities in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Ladhiqiyah, As Sweida and Tartous governorates; and medicines and supplies for 48,270 people in Ar Rastan, Akradisneh and Ein el-Nisr in Homs.
- UNFPA supported 28 mobile clinics, 27 static clinics and 13 medical points operated by partners in Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Homs, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Ar Raqqah and Hama governorates to provide life-saving reproductive health services to 71,032 women and men.

Nutrition

- UNICEF provided High Energy Biscuits and plumpy doze for treatment of moderate malnutrition for 3,000 children in Ar Rastan, Homs, and 3,600 children in Douma.
- A rapid nutrition survey of conflict-affected children was completed in all 14 governorates except Ar Raqqah and Al Hasakeh. The Ministry of Health has received the survey data from most locations, including hard-to-reach areas, such as Kiswah and Qusaya in Rif Dimashq and Sulaymaniyah in Aleppo. Preliminary results are expected in the next reporting period.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

- UNICEF interventions enabled access to clean water to some 16.5 million people in all 14 governorates through the provision of chlorine, with 43 per cent (6.6 million people) of them in non-government-controlled areas.
- UNICEF reached 20,680 people with water, sanitation and hygiene support in Al Hasakeh and 16,500 in Idlib governorates, including hard-to-reach areas.
- The United Nations Population Fund distributed 11,884 female and 6,500 male dignity kits to affected people.

Education

- UNICEF, along with the Directorate of Education, distributed 11,905 school bags to Al Hasakeh city and 8,071 to Qamishli, both hard-to-reach areas, assisting 19,976 children.
- In Al Waer, three prefabricated classrooms were delivered to one school in the area. To date, 15 prefabricated classrooms have been installed in Al Waer schools, providing a protected learning environment to 1,200 children.
- During the reporting period, UNICEF, through its partner Action Against Hunger, completed light rehabilitation and hygiene awareness activities for 14 schools in Al Hasakeh city, benefitting 11,833 children.

Palestine refugees

- UNRWA provided food to 19,500 people, cash assistance to 58,551 people, 77,357 health consultations and 422 microfinance loans.
- UNRWA participated in the WHO-led campaign to vaccinate or revaccinate all children against polio in the Syrian Arab Republic, which covered 65 per cent of at-risk Palestine refugees. Vaccination rates among Palestine refugees for polio were already high (99 per cent coverage).

Agriculture

- The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provided agricultural support to 18,081 beneficiaries (2,583 households); 14,399 beneficiaries (2,057 households) in Rif Dimashq, Idlib and Hama governorates received animal feed and 3,682 beneficiaries (562 households) in Rif Dimashq governorate received poultry packages.
- FAO and SARC finalized arrangements for the transportation and distribution of seeds to Ar Raqqah governorate for storage and planting during the upcoming planting season.

Protection and community services

- UNHCR continued to extend community and protection services support through field staff in 7 key locations, 11 community centres, partnerships with international and local NGOs and more than 200 community outreach volunteers. On 21 May, the Governor of Homs granted UNHCR access to Al Andalus Processing Facility for the first time since April. The facility currently accommodates 350 individuals, the majority of whom were evacuated from the Old City of Homs.
- UNHCR recently launched a legal aid programme for internally displaced persons in Tartous in cooperation with the Syrian Society for Social Development and the Danish Refugee Council.
- UNICEF reached 12,385 children with essential psychosocial support services provided through partners in Hama, Quneitra, Aleppo, Tartous, Homs, Ladhiqiyah and Damascus governorates. This included support to 1,437 children in Al Waer, a hard-to-reach area in Homs governorate, through a new local partner NGO.
- UNHCR provides assistance to the approximately 35,000 registered refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic, the majority from Iraq.